



Report Number : ICRR0021510

## 1. Project Data

**Project ID**

**Project Name**



**b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?**

No

**c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?**

## **Independent Evaluation Group (IEG)**



ICR advises that at appraisal only national level figures were available and these were adjusted during implementation based on site-specific Implementation targets which were increased to reflect the larger funding available.

2015:

A reallocation between disbursement categories to accommodate changes in disbursement amounts.

2017:

A last extension of the project closing date, to June 2018.

Additional to these formal restructurings, there was a change in management, through merger of the implementation units of LWH and the Rural Sector Support Project followed by transfer of the combined implementation unit from the Ministry of Agriculture to the Rwanda Agriculture and Animal Resources Development Board. This was to be in line with Rwanda's policy to transfer implementation activities from the ministries to implementing agencies.

Dates:

LWH was approved on December 22, 2010, with a projected closing date of June 30, 2014 - an estimated project period of just over 4 years. Actual closure was on June 2, 2018 - a project period of eight years, double the appraisal estimate (refer above and section 4).



In order to raise agricultural growth and accelerate poverty alleviation, both the Government's development strategy – the Strategic Plan for the Transformation of Agriculture in Rwanda Phase II, 2009-2012; and the



## **Objective 1**

### **Objective**

Increase Agricultural Productivity

### **Rationale**

The project's first Objective - to increase agricultural productivity - was addressed through a variety of measures to improve farming practices and provide supporting infrastructure. Actions covered crop husbandry, cropping patterns, varieties, and crop mix; use of fertilizer; upgrading of soils; sustainable land management; terracing; increased irrigated area including establishment of water user associations; provision of agricultural extension services; technical and organizational training; and provision of credit.

Key Outputs (achievements) are summarized below:

1. The proportion of male farmers using improved farming methods rose to 93% compared with 30% baseline and 90% targeted. Achievements for female farmers were 90% compared with 25 % baseline and 90% targeted originally (at appraisal)
2. The area developed for irrigation reached 2,555 ha, as against the original target of 900 ha and the revised (including the extension period) target of 2368 ha.
3. 55,000 kitchen gardens were established, compared with 15,000 originally targeted and a revised target of 19,000.
4. The cost recovery ratio for operations and maintenance of water user associations (WUAs) reached 66% compared with the original and unchanged target of 40%.

### Outcome

At project design stage, three monitorable indicators were chosen to assess the outcome of the project's first objective. At project completion, productivity of irrigated land was over 10 times baseline productivity and was 230 percent higher than the original target at appraisal. Non-irrigated agriculture also had high increases. Productivity was seven times the baseline productivity, and 150 percent greater than the targeted productivity set at appraisal. There was also an increase in the number of beneficiaries, which increased threefold compared with the target. Results are shown below:

1. The Productivity of Irrigated Areas reached 5,600 US\$/ha compared with targets of US\$1,700 (original) and US\$2,800 (revised), and baseline (pre-project) productivity of US\$ 492/ha.
2. The Productivity of Non-Irrigated Hillside Agriculture reached 3,500 \$/ha compared with the original target of 1,400 US\$/ha and the revised target of \$2,500/ha, and the baseline productivity of US\$ 469/ha.
3. The Number of Beneficiaries of the project was 310,000 of which females were 150,000. The target number of beneficiaries was 105,000, of which the target for women's participation was 52,000.

(A survey conducted by the World Bank's Development Impact Evaluation Uuct.1TchetME 112/ha.

## **Independent Evaluation Group (IEG)**







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Efficacy of both Objectives was Substantial – productivity increased by 230 and 350 percent respectively on irrigated and non-irrigated land, and, based on the information available, the proportion of production





## 9. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization

### a. M&E Design

M&E was based on a clear Theory of Change with well-defined impact pathways and generally practical indicators for monitoring changes. M&E was embedded into the Ministry of Agriculture's monitoring system, providing better means for consistency over time and across activities. Farmers' self-help groups and cooperatives were used as a primary means of collecting data. Beneficiary surveys were also used.

### b. M&E Implementation

Monitorable indicators over the project period were not changed, except in physical targets which were increased to reflect the larger size of the program resulting from the additional financing. The indicators enabled comparisons over time of project outputs, and, to a lesser extent, impacts and outcomes.

Monitoring and analysis of outcomes could have been further elaborated, to add to the understanding of what the outcome was. For instance, for the commercialization objective – the only indicator chosen was the changes in “commercialization.” Yet only to know that agriculture had been “commercialized” conveys little idea of what happened and why. Greater elaboration of the types of crops and interventions which were particularly impactful, and of the main sources of commercialization – e.g. cooperatives, private businesses, individual farmers - would have provided additional operationally useful information. Also, monitorable indicators for outcomes could have been buttressed by other information that might be expected to be consistent with the primary indicator – for instance, from different sources, or from tracking variables with proxy value to the main indicator.

There is little commentary in the ICR on the quality and reliability of M&E data (for instance, as relevant, brief remarks on sources of data, survey design, sampling, capacity of enumerators, etc.). Such information would have helped ascertain the reliability of some key project results, especially for commercialization (section 4).

### c. M&E Utilization

M&E operated within a performance-based culture receptive to M&E findings. Data was used for operational decision making by government policy makers, and in Bank supervision missions. The mainstreaming of M&E into the overall LWH program enabled project data to be integrated into Rwanda's Sector Wide Approach for the agriculture sector, enhancing utility in this broader program. Data from the independent DIME survey (section 4) could have been more integrated into the overall evaluation framework.

M&E Quality Overall



The M&E system provided a base for project implementation, but with some weaknesses in monitoring of outcomes. Considering the M&E program as a whole though, the overall Quality of M&E is rated Substantial.

## **M&E Quality Rating**

Substantial

## **10. Other Issues**

### **a. Safeguards**

#### Environmental

The project was category B and triggered the following safeguards: Environmental Assessment (OP/BP4.01); Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12); Natural Habitats (OP/BP 4.04); Forests (OP/BP 4.36); Pest management (OP 4.09); Physical Cultural Resources (OP/BP 4.11); Safety of Dams (OP/BP 4.37); and Projects on International Waterways (OP/BP 7.50). An Environmental and Social Framework and a Pest Management Plan were prepared. The Framework was needed as locations and types of investments could not be predicted in advance, hence the Framework provided overall guidance for environmental and social screening of the sub-projects. Where an investment was large or diverse, a dedicated environmental and social assessment was made.

Although the issues and actions for the environmental and social aspects of the project are well covered in the ICR, and preparation of a Pest Management Plan is mentioned, for the majority of safeguards, there is no or minimal information on the situation and any actions taken. Five of the safeguards triggered are in this situation (natural habitats, forests, physical cultural resources, safety of dams and projects on international waters). Even if some of these are found to be not relevant to LWH, brief reference to the safeguard and why there are no issues to be addressed, would have been desirable, or where some issues are identified, appropriate actions could have been identified.

#### Social

As the sites of works could not necessarily be predetermined under a community driven project, a Resettlement Policy Framework was prepared, and screening and review procedures were issued to provide guidance on resettlement. For sites identified as requiring a comprehensive resettlement program, a Resettlement Action Plan was prepared. Six irrigation sites had such RAPs, but resettlement policy was also applied for compensating farmers affected by terracing and other small infrastructure. There was a total of 2,135 Project Affected Households, of which 117 required relocation. Compensation and job opportunities were provided in advance of any civil works. Equitable compensation was facilitated by the requirement that land titles and bank accounts of married couples had to be shared between both partners. And locally led grievance committees were established for resolving disputes between project affected persons.



**b. Fiduciary Compliance**

Financial Management

Once financial staff had gained experience, accounting was up to date and LWH’s financial management, which had been rated moderately satisfactory during the first two years of the project, was rated satisfactory throughout subsequent project implementation. Financial statements and audit reports were provided in timely fashion and all audits were unqualified. Disbursements were also timely. Good internal control and adequate staffing contributed to this generally good performance.

Procurement

Procurement was carried out following Bank procedures, though with implementation issues initially - in particular, delays in design studies, and cases of non-responsive bids. The latter was due to capacity constraints of local contractors, which were too small to handle the financing needs for larger contracts. Other issues were unrealistic procurement plans and uneven contract management. Nevertheless, the ICR does not refer to any irregularities, the issues being more a matter of weak administration. The procurement problems were progressively resolved, with intensive supervision from Bank staff, over the first several years of the project, and do not appear to have significantly delayed project implementation. By the fourth year of the project, procurement was rated satisfactory, although it was downgraded to moderately satisfactory in 2017, due to understaffing in the procurement unit. In the event, the existing staff were able to shoulder the workload, made easier by closure of other projects with procurement managed by the LWH procurement unit.

**c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)**

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**d. Other**

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**11. Ratings**

Ratings	ICR	IEG	Reason for Disagreements/Comment
Outcome	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	---
Bank Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	---



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Quality of M&E	Substantial	Substantial	---
Quality of ICR		Substantial	---

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## 12. Lessons

1. *A major extension of a project's implementation period might be appropriate if the extension is for strategic reasons, is expected to be economically viable, is adequately resourced, and is practically implemented.*

The unusual step of doubling the project period was: to maintain the momentum of the field development program, which was still acquiring experience, to facilitate the involvement of financing partners in Rwanda's sector-wide agricultural development program; and, to further consolidate institutional links. An alternative would have been a new project providing opportunity for a fresh look at the development program, but the LWH's extended program was effectively implemented, contributing to the broader and longer-term goals of Rwanda's rural development program.

2. *Success with a long-term project extension is facilitated by a clear strategy and technical features.*

Amongst the factors driving the success of the project's additional 4 ½ year program were: the extension (i)-1(mpl





Please explain

As part of an assessment of the experience in watershed improvements of several projects to ascertain factors that can contribute to success.

#### **14. Comments on Quality of ICR**